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Introduction 
Brandon was a senior in high school when he met a 14-year-old girl on a 
church youth trip.  With her parents’ blessing, they began to date, and 
openly saw each other romantically for almost a year.  When it was 
disclosed that consensual sex had occurred, her parents pressed charges 
against Brandon.  Brandon was convicted of sexual assault and placed 
on the sex offender registry in his state.2 
Enacted in 2006, Title I of the Adam Walsh Act (AWA)3 contains 
a comprehensive revision of the national standards for sex offender 
registration and notification.4  That Title of the AWA, the Sexual 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), creates a new 
federal crime allowing for the prosecution of individuals who fail to 
register as required by SORNA.5  The failure to register crime is 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).6  Notably, § 2250(a)(2)(B) requires 
that an offender convicted of a state sex offense travel in interstate 
commerce before he can be subject to federal prosecution under 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B).7 
                                                                                                                 
 2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS:  SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US, 
Sept. 2007, at 5, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907 
webwcover.pdf. 
 3. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §16901. 
 4. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 42 U.S.C.A. 16913 (West 2010).  
 5. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (making it a crime for anyone who "knowingly 
fails to register or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act"). 
 6. See id. (making the failure to register or update sex-offender registration a crime). 
 7. See id. (making it a crime for anyone who "travels in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country" and knowingly fails to register 
or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act). 
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Pursuant to SORNA, if Brandon has ever traveled or will ever 
travel in interstate commerce, he is subject to prosecution for the 
federal crime of failure to register.8  Brandon’s travel in interstate 
commerce need neither be with the intent of evading registration 
requirements nor contemporaneous with his hypothetical failure to register.9  
Brandon, a high school student convicted of having consensual sex with his 
teenage girlfriend, will have to register in the jurisdiction in which he lives, 
in the jurisdiction where he goes to school, and in the jurisdiction where he 
is employed.10  If at any time Brandon fails to register, he will be subject to 
up to ten years of incarceration.11  There is no requirement that the penalty 
imposed for failure to register be proportional to the penalty imposed for 
the original crime.12 
This Note argues that § 2250(a)(2)(B) impermissibly exceeds 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Although all circuit courts 
considering this issue have upheld the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B), 
a growing minority of federal district courts are striking down 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) as an impermissible exercise of congressional power.13  To 
consider SORNA and its relationship with the Commerce Clause, this Note 
consists of four substantive Parts. 
Part I analyzes the history of sex offender registration and notification 
statutes.  After a brief historical overview, this Part focuses on the 
Wetterling Protection and Safety Act and its presumed deficiencies.  Part II 
focuses on the AWA, SORNA, and 18 U.S.C. § 2250.  This Part surveys 
the scope of the legislation, examines the specific language of the failure to 
register crime, and highlights the various constitutional issues that have 
arisen. 
Next, Part III provides an overview of modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, summarizes each of the relevant circuit court decisions, and 
highlights some of the federal district courts considering this issue.  Part III 
exposes the varied application of Lopez, Morrison and Raich to SORNA by 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See id. (making the failure to register or update sex-offender registration a crime). 
 9. See id. (stating only "travel[ing] in interstate or foreign commerce" as a condition 
for prosecution, with no mention of intent to evade the registration requirement). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006) (noting that whoever violates this provision "shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both"). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See e.g., U.S. v. Nasci, 632 F. Supp. 2d 194, 196 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (declaring that 
SORNA was not a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause). 
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lower courts.  Finally, this Note considers whether § 2250(a)(2)(B) is a 
permissible exercise of congressional commerce powers.  Notwithstanding 
the presence of the jurisdictional element, Part IV concludes that 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) is inadequate to support Commerce Clause authority.  In 
reaching this conclusion, this Note suggests that courts should apply some 
level of heightened scrutiny to Commerce Clause challenges and posits that 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) cannot be sustained under any of the three Lopez categories 
of permissible regulation. 
I.  The History of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Statutes 
A.  Early State Legislation 
While Title I of the AWA is new, sex offender registration and 
notification laws are not.14  Although most registration laws were 
promulgated in the 1990s, a few states have had registration statues for over 
seventy years.15  In 1937, Florida was the first state to adopt a registration 
law; the law, however, required registration only of those convicted of 
felonies involving moral turpitude and living in the state’s three most 
populous counties.16  In 1947, California "enacted the nation’s first 
registration law of state-wide application, targeting convicted sex-
offenders."17  Despite lobbying efforts, interest by state governments in 
sexual offender registration statutes remained, at best, moderate—by 1989 
only twelve states had implemented registration laws.18 
A radical change in public policy occurred in the 1990s.19  Several 
high-profile sexual assaults of children by convicted sex offenders incited 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. 16901. 
 15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 35 ("While a few states have had sex 
offender registries since the 1940s, most states began creating registries in the 1990s.").  
 16. See generally WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER:  A HISTORY OF 
CRIMINAL REGISTRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (Stanford Univ. Press 2008) (providing a 
general discussion on the history of state and federal sexual offender registration and 
notification statutes), and Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification:  Past, Present and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5 
(2008) [hereinafter Logan, Sex Offender Registration] (discussing the history of sexual 
offender registration and notification statutes). 
 17. Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16. 
 18. See id. (discussing local and state registration laws). 
 19. See id. ("From 1990 onward, however, public policy radically changed when a 
handful of high-profile sexual assaults of children by ex-offenders inspired legislative 
attention."). 
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community outrage and, as a response, notification statutes rapidly swept 
the country.20  Most notably, the tragic assault and murder of Megan Kanka 
was the catalyst for New Jersey to enact the first notification statute aptly 
named Megan’s Law.21 
B.  An Overview of Federal Legislation Leading up to the Adam Walsh 
Act:  The Wetterling Act 
Shortly after New Jersey signed its registration statute into law, 
President Clinton enacted the first federal offender registration law—the 
Jacob Wetterling Crimes against Children and Sexual Violent Offenders 
Registration Act ("Wetterling Act").22  The Wetterling Act conditioned 
certain "federal law enforcement funding on the States’ adoption of sex 
offender registration laws and set [] minimum standards for state 
programs."23  In 1996, the Act was amended to include provisions for 
community notification.24  The Wetterling Act, and its later amendments, 
did not impose federal criminal liability for failure to comply with the 
statutory requirements.25  According to its principal author, the purpose of 
the Wetterling Act was to prod all states to enact sex offender legislation 
laws and to provide for a national registration system to handle offenders 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See id. (discussing how the sexual abuse and murder of Megan Kanka by a 
convicted sex offender spawned national interested in state legislation—such legislation 
became known as "Megan’s Laws"); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003) 
(describing that the seven-year-old girl, Megan Kanka "was sexually assaulted and murdered 
in 1994 by a neighbor who, unknown to the victim’s family, had prior convictions for sex 
offenses against children"). 
 21. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§  2C:7–12 (2001) (declaring that "the public safety will be 
enhanced by making information about certain sex offenders contained in the sex offender 
central registry . . . available to the public through the Internet"). 
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (stating that the Attorney General shall establish 
guidelines for State programs); see also Corey R. Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the 
Others:  Why The Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New 
Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 372 (2009) (discussing the enactment 
of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders 
Registration Act). 
 23. Doe, 538 U.S. at 89–90. 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2006) ("The State or any agency authorized by the 
State shall release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a 
specific person required to register under this section . . . ."). 
 25. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (2006) (discussing that the failure to register under a 
State program will subject the individual to "criminal penalties in any State in which the 
person has so failed"). 
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who move from one state to another.26  Conditioned upon the receipt of 
federal funding, by 1996 every state had enacted some type of sexual 
offender registration legislation.27 
II.  The Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) 
Although the Wetterling Act successfully prompted all states and the 
District of Columbia to enact some type of Megan’s Law, the Act failed to 
establish an effective uniform national registration system.28  Despite 
various amendments to the Act, an estimated 100,000 out of 500,000 
offenders remained "unregistered and their locations unknown to the public 
and law enforcement."29  Additionally, "there [remained] a 200,000 person 
difference between all of the state registries and the federal National Sex 
Offender Registry."30  To strengthen registration and notification provisions 
and to cure deficiencies of past legislation, in 2005, three separate bills 
were introduced into Congress.31  The bill known as the Adam Walsh Act 
soon gained bipartisan approval.32 
On July 27, 2006, President Bush signed the AWA into law.33  Named 
after Adam Walsh, the AWA was enacted on the twenty-fifth anniversary 
of his abduction and disappearance.34  This comprehensive piece of 
                                                                                                                 
 26. 139 CONG. REC. H10321 (1993); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 
42 ("One of the goals of the Act was to create more uniformity among state registration 
schemes, to avoid some of the confusion as to registration requirements when registrants 
moved to different states."). 
 27. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 52 (noting that all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia passed their own Megan’s Laws). 
 28. See id. at 42 (noting that uniformity will be elusive because the "Act does not limit 
the authority of states to go beyond federal law"). 
 29. 152 CONG. REC. H5722 (2006). 
 30. Id. at H5726. 
 31. See Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16, at 6 (discussing the 
enactment of three separate bills that sought to strengthen registration and notification in 
various ways). 
 32. See id. at 6–7 (noting that the Adam Walsh Act gained approval under the 
leadership of Congressman Mark Foley). 
 33. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901; see also 
Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16, at 7 n.22 ("Under the terms of the AWA, 
the Wetterling Act and other federal registration provisions will cease to be in effect either 
as of July 27, 2009 or one year after the availability of computer software to be used by 
states to implement the AWA, whichever is later."). 
 34. See Kris Axtman, Efforts to Grow to Keep Tabs on Sex Offenders, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, July 28, 2008, at 1 (noting that child advocates call the Adam Walsh 
490 16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 483 (2010) 
legislation sought to "protect the public from sex offenders and offenders 
against children . . . [and to] establish[] a comprehensive national system 
for the registration of those offenders."35  The Act instituted sweeping 
changes giving the federal government significantly more control over the 
regulation of sex offenders.36 
A.  Overview of Title I of the Adam Walsh Act:  The Sexual Offender 
Registration and Notification Provision (SORNA) 
SORNA, Title I of the AWA, functions as an independent and stand-
alone piece of legislation.37   In passing SORNA, Congress sought to "close 
potential gaps and loopholes under the old law, and [to] generally 
strengthen the nationwide network of sex offender registration and 
notification programs . . . ."38  To protect the public from sex offenders, 
SORNA requires the creation of a national sex offender registry,39 makes 
registration of qualifying offenders mandatory,40 creates a federal 
substantive crime for failing to register,41 and retroactively applies to 
offenses committed before the promulgation of SORNA.42  Although the 
general effectiveness of SORNA raises legitimate questions, this Note 
                                                                                                                 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 "the most sweeping sex-offender legislation in 25 
years . . . "); see also Ron Ishoy, Adam Walsh Murder Case Unsolved, But Tragedy Helped 
Change U.S. Laws, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 1991, at 1A (reporting that the abduction of 
Adam Walsh from a shopping mall in Florida served as the catalyst for his father, John 
Walsh, to advocate for missing children and to host the television show America’s Most 
Wanted).  
 35. See Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16, at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16901 (2006)).  
 36. See Craig Albee, SORNA:  What Every Wisconsin Criminal Defense Lawyer 
Should Know, 16 THE WISC. DEFENDER 1, 2  (2008) (noting that the AWA established a new 
national sex offender registration law (SORNA), eliminated statutes of limitations for most 
offenses, created new substantive crimes, increased mandatory minimum and statutory 
maximum sentences for federal crimes against children and sex crimes, and created a 
national sex offender registry). 
 37. See Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2010) 
(declaring the purpose of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act).  
 38. The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 30210-01 (May 30, 2007). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 16912(a) (2006). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006). 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006). 
 42. 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007). 
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focuses exclusively on the constitutional issues raised by the new federal 
crime for failing to register as a sex offender.43 
B.  The New Federal Crime for a Sex Offender’s Failure to Register:         
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) 
1.  Analysis of Statutory Language 
Distinct from the Wetterling Act, SORNA makes it a federal felony to 
knowingly fail to register as a sex offender.  Pursuant to the crime for 
failing to register, "sex offenders are required to comply with the SORNA 
registration requirements in the jurisdictions in which they reside, are 
employed, or attend school as mandatory conditions of their federal 
supervision . . . and may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 if they fail 
to do so."44  The statute provides: 
(a) In general.  —Whoever— 
(1) Is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act; 
(2)(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification and Act by reason of a conviction under 
Federal law (including the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the law of 
                                                                                                                 
 43. As a general matter, a number of factors intimate that SORNA fails to accomplish 
its stated purpose of effectively promoting public safety.  First, SORNA is both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive in scope.  While the legislation imposes an overly broad 
definition of "sex offender" it simultaneously fails to address many issues inextricably 
intertwined with public safety.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i) (2006) (defining a sex 
offender as an individual convicted of "a criminal offense that has an element involving a 
sexual act of sexual contact with another").  For example, SORNA fails to acknowledge that 
family friends and acquaintances commit the vast majority of sex offenses against children.  
Second, unfettered access to online databases makes it unduly burdensome for the sex 
offender to re-assimilate into the community.  Registry requirements make it difficult for the 
offender to secure stable employment or housing and, in some circumstances, has led to 
vigilante violence.  See Daniel L. Feldman, The "Scarlett Letter Laws" of the 1990’s:  A 
Response to Critics, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1103 (1997) (stating that between seventy-five 
and eighty-nine percent of sex offenses are committed by relatives and friends).  Finally, the 
relationship between SORNA and public safety is unknown.  Very little empirical research 
speaks to the effectiveness of either SORNA or previous legislation.  See generally Sarah 
Welchans, Megan’s Law:  Evaluations of Sexual Offender Registries, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y 
REV. 123 (2005) (providing a literature review of the empirical evaluations of sex offender 
registration and community notification policies). 
 44. The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 30210–01 (May 30, 2007). 
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the District of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory or 
possession of the United States; or 
(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or 
resides in, Indian country; and 
(3) knowingly fails to register or update registration as required by the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
both.45 
As evidenced by § 2250(a), the failure to register crime encompasses 
two distinct groups of offenders.46  Section § 2250(a)(2)(A) requires that, 
regardless of interstate travel, all sex offenders convicted of federal crimes 
register, and § 2250(a)(2)(B) requires that those sex offenders convicted of 
state crimes register only when the individual travels in interstate 
commerce.47   That said, only § 2250(a)(2)(B) contains a jurisdictional 
element.  While both provisions are subject to constitutional scrutiny, this 
Note focuses exclusively on the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B). 
Section 2250(a) imposes the stringent penalty of up to ten years 
imprisonment upon individuals who knowingly fail to either register or 
update their registration.48  Separate provisions contained within SORNA 
delineate the requirements for who is required to register, how that 
individual initially registers, and when that individual must update such 
registry information.49  There is no requirement that the penalty imposed for 
the failure to register be proportional to the penalty imposed for the original 
crime. 50  The penalty clause of §2250(a) "can be an order of magnitude 
greater than the maximum allowable for the offender’s original offense."51  
Finally, although the statute’s mens rea element requires knowledge, 
                                                                                                                 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006). 
 46. See id. (making failure to register or update sex-offender registration a crime for 
both sex offenders in general and sex offenders who travel in interstate or foreign 
commerce). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 48. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (stating that those who are required and knowingly 
fail to register "shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both"). 
 49. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006) (defining a sex offender as "anyone who has 
committed a sex offense" and creating a three-tiered system which categorizes offenders 
based upon the seriousness of their offense(s) and imposes various levels of registry 
requirements). 
 50. See 42 U.S.C § 16913 (2006) (defining the initial registry requirements for 
offenders and providing how those offenders can keep their registry current). 
 51. Yung, supra note 22, at 380. 
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knowledge is presumed under American common law.52  Accordingly, 
§ 2250(a) has been interpreted to function as a strict liability crime.53 
2.  Constitutional Challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) 
The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) has been 
challenged on several grounds.  These challenges have been met with 
relatively little success.54  First, defendants argue that Congress 
unconstitutionally delegated its legislative authority to the Attorney 
General and, consequently, that SORNA violates the nondelegation 
doctrine.55  Second, defendants assert that SORNA violates the Ex Post 
Facto Clause by increasing the punishment one received for the 
commission of a sex offense that occurred before SORNA’s effective 
date.56  Third, advancing several varying rationales, defendants argue that 
SORNA violates the Due Process Clause.57  Finally, defendants contend 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See id. (discussing the mens rea requirement and the presumption of knowledge of 
the law). 
 53. See id. ("It is hard to imagine many fact patterns in which lack of knowledge is a 
defense since knowledge of the law is presumed under U.S. common law."). 
 54. See generally Tracy Bateman Farrell, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16902 et 
seq., its Enforcement Provision, 18 U.S.C.A § 2250, and Associated Regulations, 30 A.L.R. 
FED. 2d 213 (2008) [hereinafter 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d 213] (providing a collection and analysis 
of cases, updated weekly, that have considered the constitutionality of SORNA). 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Gould, 526 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D. Md. 2007) (holding that 
SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine); see generally 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d 213, 
supra note 54 (providing an exhaustive list of the cases that have considered whether 
SORNA violates the nondelegation doctrine).  To date, no federal court considering the issue 
has found that Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by giving the Attorney General 
the authority to issue a ruling as to the retroactive application of SORNA.  See 30 A.L.R. 
FED. 2d 213, supra note 54. 
 56. Compare United States v. Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D.R.I. 2008) (holding 
that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause), with United States v. Gillette, 553 
F. Supp. 2d 524 (D.V.I. 2008) (holding that SORNA was unconstitutional as applied to those 
who traveled in interstate commerce before the effective date of SORNA).  See generally 30 
A.L.R. FED. 2d 213 (providing a list of the cases considering the Ex Post Facto Clause and 
SORNA). 
 57. See United States v. Pitts, 2008 WL 474244 (M.D. La. 2007) (holding that the 
defendant’s procedural due process rights were not violated on the ground that the defendant 
did not have notice of SORNA’s registration requirement), and United States v. Mason, 510 
F. Supp. 2d 923 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that SORNA did not violate substantive due 
process because the legislation was rationally related to a legitimate government interest). 
But see United States v. Barnes, 2007 WL 2119895 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the 
defendant’s procedural due process rights were violated on the ground that the defendant did 
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that Congress’s enactment of SORNA is an impermissible exercise of its 
Commerce Clause powers.58 
III.  The Commerce Clause and SORNA:  Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
and Federal Court Treatment of Commerce Clause Challenges to SORNA 
Unlike state laws, a federal law must be premised on an enumerated 
power.59  Basic to the American scheme of federalism, this requirement 
sought to create spheres of authority to "ensure protection of our 
fundamental liberties."60  "[T]he powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which 
are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite."61  The 
Constitution delegated the power to regulate interstate commerce to 
Congress.62  Congress finds constitutional support for 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) in the Commerce Clause.63 
A.  Modern Commerce Clause Jurisprudence:  Lopez, Morrison, and Raich 
The scope of congressional powers under modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence is largely defined by three cases:  United States v. Lopez,64 
United States v. Morrison,65 and Gonzalez v. Raich.66  In Lopez, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, for the first time in sixty years, held that Congress, by 
                                                                                                                 
not have notice of SORNA’s registration requirement). 
 58. See infra Part III and accompanying notes and text (discussing the validity of the 
Commerce Clause challenges to SORNA). 
 59. See James Madison, The Federalist No. 45 (1788), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS, 292–93 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter The Federalist No. 45]. 
 60. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
 61. The Federalist No. 45, at 292–93. 
 62. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."). 
 63. See e.g., CONG. REC. H5715 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (discussing the impact of 
child pornographers on interstate commerce). 
 64. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (affirming the Fifth Circuit and 
concluding that Congress overreached the scope of the Commerce Clause). 
 65. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (holding, per Justice 
Rehnquist, that parts of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) exceeded Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers). 
 66. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (holding that Congress had the authority 
to regulate intra-state marijuana trade, because it was an economic, albeit illegal, activity). 
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passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act67 (GFSZA) had overreached the 
scope of the Commerce Clause.68  The Court emphasized that Congress 
failed both to make specific findings as to how the regulated activity affects 
interstate commerce and to include a jurisdictional nexus between the 
activity being regulated and interstate commerce.69  Five years later, the 
Court again struck down non-economic, criminal legislation in United 
States v. Morrison.70  Although Congress in Morrison did provide detailed 
findings with regard to how gender-related crimes impacted the travel of 
women, the Court found the causal relationship to be too attenuated.71  
Importantly, both cases employed some level of heightened review.72  Post 
Lopez and Morrison there is not much room for completely intrastate non-
economic regulation to survive judicial review.73  Lopez and Morrison 
notwithstanding, in Gonzalez v. Raich, the Court upheld the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) as a permissible use of congressional commerce 
authority.74  Distinguishing Lopez and Morrison, the Court characterized 
the CSA as regulating "quintessentially economic activities".75  The Court 
held that the CSA regulated commodities for which there was an interstate 
market, albeit an illegal one.76  Affording Congress great deference, the 
Court concluded that Congress had a rational basis to regulate the 
                                                                                                                 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 922, invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
 68. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (affirming the appellate 
courts’ conclusion that the GFSZA exceeded congressional commerce authority). 
 69. Id. at 562. 
 70. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (holding, per Justice 
Rehnquist, that parts of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) exceeded Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers). 
 71. See id. at 614 (reasoning that the Government’s arguments were too attenuated and 
"[i]f accepted petitioners reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as 
the nationwide aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, 
transit or consumption").  
 72. See id. (stressing that simply because Congress sees a rational reason for 
regulating a particular non-economic conduct under the Commerce Clause does not make it 
permissible). 
 73. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (holding that Congress had the 
authority to regulate intra-state marijuana trade, because it was an economic, albeit illegal, 
activity). 
 74. See id. at 2 ("Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit 
the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law."). 
 75. See id. at 3 ("[T]he CSA regulates quintessentially economic activities:  the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, 
and lucrative, interstate market."). 
 76. See id. at 18 ("[R]espondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible 
commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market."). 
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production and consumption of marijuana for personal, medicinal use.77  
Although distinguishable from Lopez and Morrison, Raich undeniably 
marks a departure from a narrow conception of the Commerce Clause. 
1.  United States v. Lopez:  The Federalism Revolution—Part One 
In the landmark opinion of United States v. Lopez, the Court held that 
the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense for 
an individual to possess a firearm in a school zone, exceeded congressional 
Commerce Clause authority.78  The Court first noted the overarching 
federalism principles, which guided its decision to effectively narrow the 
scope of congressional commerce powers.79  Respect for the "numerous and 
indefinite"80 powers that are to remain with the State governments drove the 
majority opinion—"[j]ust as the separation and independence of the 
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of 
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk 
of tyranny and abuse from either front."81 
The Court then looked to the history of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence and, drawing from the structure of prior case law, laid out the 
proper framework by which courts should analyze Commerce Clause 
challenges:  Lopez articulated three broad categories of activity that 
Congress may regulate under its commerce power.82  "First, Congress may 
regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce."83  Second, 
Congress may "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activities."84  "Finally, Congress’s 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See id. at 20 ("Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-
consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market 
conditions."). 
 78. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (affirming the Fifth Circuit 
and concluding that Congress overreached the scope of the Commerce Clause). 
 79. See id. (highlighting that the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers, 
that the enumerated powers are "few and defined," and that the powers reserved for the 
states are "numerous and indefinite"). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S 452, 458 (1991)). 
 82. Id. at 558. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce."85 
Analyzing the GFSZA under the third Lopez prong, the Court drew 
guidance from prior case law sustaining regulations that ‘substantially 
affected’ interstate commerce.  Writing for the majority, Rehnquist drew 
the distinction between economic and non-economic regulations and 
concluded, "[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."86  To 
determine whether an economic activity has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, prior case law permits the effect to be viewed in the 
aggregate—even if the individual instances of conduct have de minimis 
impact on interstate commerce if, viewed in the aggregate, they have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the regulation will be sustained.87  
The distinction between economic and non-economic activities likely 
proved outcome determinative in Lopez:  because this criminal statute could 
not be termed ‘economic’ or ‘commercial’ in nature, the Court held that it 
could not be "sustained under the Court’s cases upholding regulations of 
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, 
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce."88  
Allowing aggregation would unduly expand the scope of federal power 
such that the Court would be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an 
individual that Congress is without power to regulate."89 
Although the non-economic nature of the statute did not, per se, bring 
the GFSZA outside of the realm of congressional commerce authority, 
additional infirmities mandated the conclusion that Congress 
unconstitutionally exceeded its powers.90  No one factor being dispositive, 
the Court first noted that the GFSZA lacked a jurisdictional element, 
"which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that 
additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce."91  Second, "[n]either the statute nor its legislative history 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 558–59. 
 86. Id. at 560. 
 87. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (announcing and 
employing the aggregation principle; in Wickard the Court aggregated individual instances 
of home-grown wheat to conclude that, in the aggregate, the activity had a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce). 
 88. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
 89. Id. at 564. 
 90. See id. at 567–68 (concluding that Congress exceeded its powers). 
 91. Id. at 562. 
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contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon 
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone."92  Finally, the 
Court deemed too attenuated the "costs of crime" and "national 
productivity" arguments advanced by the Government, which sought to 
demonstrate the substantial effect that guns in school posed to interstate 
commerce.93  
Importantly, Lopez made no mention of the rational basis test espoused 
in earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  The question was not whether 
Congress could have rationally concluded that the guns in school, 
regardless of any interstate movement, substantially affected interstate 
commerce, but rather whether the sufficient nexus to interstate commerce 
actually existed.94  The Lopez Court held that the GFSZA failed to fit into 
any of the three broad categories of permissible congressional regulation.95  
The Court concludes, "[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we 
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair 
to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power the sort retained by the States."96 
2.  United States v. Morrison:  The Federalism Revolution—Part Two 
In United States v. Morrison, the majority struck down parts of federal 
legislation regulating gender-motivated violence—a non-economic, 
intrastate activity.97  The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) gave 
women a private, federal cause of action for lawsuits subject to gender-
motivated violence.98  When analyzing the constitutionality of the statute’s 
civil remedy, the Court determined that the proper inquiry was whether the 
statute substantially affected interstate commerce.99  Attempting to clarify 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id at 564 ("Under the theories that the Government presents in support of 
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as 
criminal law enforcement of education where States have historically been sovereign."). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 568. 
 96. Id. at 567. 
 97. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (affirming the Fourth 
Circuit and concluding that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to enact the civil 
remedy of VAWA). 
 98. Id. at 605. 
 99. Id. at 609 ("Petitioners do not contend that these cases fall within either of the first 
two categories of Commerce Clause regulation.  They seek to sustain § 13981 as a regulation 
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Lopez’s third prong, Rehnquist outlined four factors that courts should 
balance when considering whether something "substantially affects" 
interstate commerce.100  A court should consider:  1) whether the activity 
being regulated is commercial or economic in nature; 2) whether the statute 
contains a jurisdictional element to limit its scope; 3) whether congressional 
findings reflect effects upon interstate commerce; and 4) whether the nexus 
or link between the activity being regulated and interstate commerce is 
attenuated.101 
Applying these four factors, the Court first reiterated the centrality of 
the economic versus non-economic distinction to its decision in Lopez—"a 
fair reading of Lopez shows that the non-economic, criminal nature of the 
conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case."102  Like the 
GFSZA, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity."103  Second, the statute at issue contained no 
semblance of a jurisdictional element.104  Third, the Court looked to the 
existence of legislative fact-finding and found that the statute was supported 
by findings suggesting the link between gender-motivated violence and 
interstate commerce.105  However, the Court emphasized that "[s]imply 
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so."106  Finally, the 
Court reasoned that the arguments suggesting that gender-motivated crimes 
have a substantial affect on interstate commerce were too attenuated.107  
The Court reasoned, "[i]f accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow 
Congress to regulated any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated 
impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, 
transit, or consumption."108  By acknowledging the existence of legislative 
findings but still striking down the statute, the Court implied that none of 
the four factors were dispositive.  Rather, the four factors operated as a 
balancing test utilized to determine whether Congress acted within the 
appropriate scope of its commerce authority. 
                                                                                                                 
of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce."). 
 100. Id. at 608–10. 
 101. Id. at 608–10. 
 102. Id. at 610. 
 103. Id. at 613. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 614. 
 106. Id. (citations omitted). 
 107. Id. at 615. 
 108. Id. at 614. 
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Despite the presence of legislative findings, the Court, with ease, 
struck down the statute.109   Emphasizing the non-economic, criminal nature 
of the regulated activity, the Court disallowed the aggregation of individual 
instances of conduct.110  The Court reasoned that the aggregation would 
eviscerate traditional state police powers—crimes of gender-motivated 
violence are local problems and have traditionally been addressed by local 
governments.111  Again, some form of heightened judicial scrutiny was 
employed—"whether particular operations affect interstate commerce 
sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate 
them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, can be settled 
finally only by this court."112  Lopez and Morrison give teeth to the "outer 
limits" of congressional commerce authority and stand for the proposition 
that federal statutes, which both attempt to regulate non-commercial 
activity and lack the necessary nexus between the activity being regulated 
and interstate commerce, are unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny.113 
3.  United States v. Raich:  Carving Back on the Federalism Revolution 
The Court’s opinion in Raich signifies an undeniable step away 
from Rehnquist’s "federalism revolution."114  In Raich, the Court 
considered Congress’s power to regulate the controlled substances 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. at 617. 
 110. See id. at 613.  The Court stated: 
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity.  While we need not adopt a categorical rule against 
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these 
cases, thus far in our Nations’ history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause 
regulation only where that activity is economic in nature. 
 111. Id.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 ("When Congress 
criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a change in the 
sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction." (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 112. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000). 
 113. See, e.g., Illya Somin, Gonzalez v. Raich:  Federalism as Casualty of the War on 
Drugs, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 513 (2006) ("At the very least Morrison and 
Lopez stand for the proposition that the use of aggregation to justify regulation of 
‘noneconomic’ activity is strongly disfavored, even if it is not categorically forbidden."). 
 114. See id. at 508 ("The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gonzalez v. Raich marks a 
watershed moment in the development of judicial federalism.  If it has not quite put an end 
to the Rehnquist Court’s ‘federalism revolution,’ it certainly represents an important step in 
that direction."). 
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market even when such a market was purely intrastate.115  California’s 
"Compassionate Use Act of 1996" permits the limited use of marijuana 
for medicinal purposes.116  In direct tension with the state regulation, 
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) expressly prohibits individuals 
from "possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their 
personal medical use."117  
In upholding the CSA the Court focused its inquiry to the third 
Lopez category.  First, in announcing a broad definition of economics, 
Raich stated, "[e]conomics refers to the production, distribution and 
consumption of commodities."118  Applying this definition, the Court 
characterized the CSA as "quintessentially economic" in nature119 and, 
in effect, distinguished the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison.120  
At the very least, Lopez and Morrison strongly disfavored the 
aggregation of non-economic instances of conduct.121  By 
characterizing the statute at issue as "economic" in nature, however, 
the Court was able to apply the aggregation principle utilized in 
Wickard v. Filburn122—the de minimis character of the individual 
instances being regulated is immaterial when the general regulatory 
statute bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce.123  
                                                                                                                 
 115. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2006) (discussing Congress’s ability to regulate 
the controlled market, despite the fact that the action purely takes place in California). 
 116. Id. at 5. 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 181. See id. at 25–26 (utilizing the definition of "economic" from the WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966) and defining economics as the "production, 
distribution and consumption of commodities"). 
 119. Id. at 3. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("While we do not adopt 
a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to 
decide these cases, thus far, in our Nation’s history out cases have upheld Commerce Clause 
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature." (citing 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995)) (internal citations omitted)). 
 122. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942).  The Court held: 
Where, between seed time and harvest, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was 
amended so as to change the quota and penalty provisions, but the penalty 
provided by the amendment for farm marketing excess is incurred . . . such facts 
did not establish that the amendment was invalidly "retroactive" or that it denied 
"due process of law." 
Id. 
 123. See United States v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (stating that "when a general regulatory 
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce the de minimis character of individual 
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence" (citations omitted)). 
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Characterizing a statute as economic in nature will often prove 
outcome determinative; such a classification will not only make the 
aggregation principle applicable to a finding that a regulated activity 
"substantially affects" interstate commerce but also appears to allow 
for greater deference to congressional fact-finding. 
Lopez permits congressional regulation of a noneconomic 
intrastate activity when the activity being regulated is "an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory 
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity [is] 
regulated."124  Some scholars denote this as the "broader regulatory 
scheme exception."125  Here, the Court finds that a "primary purpose of 
the CSA is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances 
in both lawful and unlawful drug markets"—a broader regulatory 
scheme.126  As such, the Court reasons, "the regulation is squarely 
within Congress’s commerce power because production of the 
commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat [the commodity 
at issue in Wickard] or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply 
and demand in the national market for that commodity."127  Although 
the regulation of the interstate illegal drug market is within 
congressional power, the prohibition on the production of homegrown, 
purely local marijuana hardly appears to be an "essential part" of the 
larger regulation of an economic activity, which would be undercut but 
for the regulation.128 
Perhaps most notably, the Court accorded more deference to 
congressional fact-finding in Raich than it did in either Lopez or 
Morrison.  The Court stated:  "[i]n assessing the scope of Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us 
is a modest one.  We need not determine whether respondents’ 
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate 
commerce, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so 
                                                                                                                 
 124. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
 125. See generally Somin, supra note 113, at 50 (discussing congressional regulation of 
noneconomic intrastate activity). 
 126. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Somin, supra note 113, at 50 (suggesting that the Court in Raich, "completely 
ignored Lopez’s statement that the broad regulatory scheme exception applies only in cases 
where inclusion of the noneconomic activity is ‘essential’ to the enforcement of the 
regulatory framework"). 
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concluding."129  By re-introducing the rational basis test to Commerce 
Clause challenges, the Court undeniably expands the Congress’s 
powers under the Commerce Clause. 
B.  Appellate Court Treatment of Commerce Clause Challenges to SORNA 
As of March 29, 2009, four Circuits have considered Commerce 
Clause challenges to SORNA.130  The Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits have all rejected defendants’ arguments.131  Although all of the 
circuit courts have upheld the constitutionality of SORNA, the rationales 
employed by the various circuits are inconsistent.132  As demonstrated by 
these four opinions, the proper application of Raich to subsequent 
Commerce Clause challenges is unclear. 
1.  Seventh Circuit Treatment:  United States v. Dixon 
In United States v. Dixon,133 the Seventh Circuit disposed of the 
defendant’s Commerce Clause argument in two sentences.134  The court’s 
opinion made no mention of Lopez, Morrison, or Raich.  Judge Posner 
reasoned that § 2250(a)(2)(B) fit into the second Lopez category—that 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) regulates the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce or 
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come 
only from intrastate activities."135  
Judge Posner then relied on the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, to dispel 
the defendant’s argument that "the movement of a person as distinct from a 
thing across state lines is not ‘commerce’ within the meaning of the 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause."136  The Seventh Circuit found that 
because the Mann Act, like § 2250(a)(2)(B), regulates "persons" rather than 
"things" in interstate commerce, § 2250(a)(2)(B) must be permissible under 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (citations omitted). 
 130. See infra Part III.B (discussing the varying rationales used by the circuit courts to 
uphold SORNA). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. United States v. Dixon, 551 F. 3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 134. See id. at 584 (finding Dixon’s Commerce Clause arguments to be without merit). 
 135. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995). 
 136. Id. 
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the second Lopez category.137  Dixon, however, fails to draw critical 
distinctions between § 2250(a)(2)(B) and the Mann Act:  the Mann Act 
explicitly requires that the movement of persons in interstate commerce be 
with the specific intent to engage in prostitution.138  Conversely, 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) lacks either intent or temporal restrictions and simply 
requires that the offender have traveled, at one time or another, in interstate 
commerce.139  Section 2250(a)(2)(B) and the Mann Act are distinguishable, 
because  § 2250(a)(2)(B) regulates a far broader swath of conduct than does 
the Mann Act. 
2.  Eighth Circuit Treatment:  United States v. May and United States v. 
Howell 
In United States v. May,140 the Eighth Circuit considered whether 
SORNA violated the Commerce Clause.  The court held that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) was a permissible exercise of congressional commerce 
authority.141  In so holding, the court found that SORNA "derives its 
authority from each prong of Lopez and most specifically, the ability to 
regulate ‘persons or things in interstate commerce’ and ‘the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce.’"142 
In sustaining the regulation under the first Lopez category, the court 
pointed to its holding in United States v. Brooks143—"[i]t has long been 
established that Congress may forbid or punish use of interstate commerce 
as an agency to promote immorality or the spread of evil or harm to the 
people of the states from the state of origin."144  When citing Brooks, the 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id.  
 138. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421.  The statute states that: 
Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, 
on in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such 
individual engage in prostitution, or any sexual activity for which any person 
can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
 139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (regulating those sex offenders who "travel[] in 
interstate commerce . . ."). 
 140. United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 141. See id. at 921–22 (holding that SORNA fits within the first two prongs of Lopez 
and is a permissible exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority). 
 142. Id. at 921. 
 143. United States v. Brooks, 267 U.S. 432 (1925). 
 144. May, 535 F.3d at 921 (quoting Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925)). 
SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT 505 
Eighth Circuit failed to consider the scope of § 2250(a)(2)(B).  Section 
2250(a)(2)(B) does not penalize the travel of sex offenders.  Rather, the 
statue penalizes the sex offenders who, at one time or another, have traveled 
in interstate commerce, and fail to register.145  If Congress intended to 
forbid the "spread of evil or harm"146 it would have restricted the travel of 
sex offenders; Congress, however, chose only to penalize an offender’s 
failure to register.147 
Attempting to fit SORNA into the third prong of Lopez, the court 
emphasized that  § 2250(a)(2)(B) contained the requisite "jurisdictional 
hook."148  The court, however, failed to address any of the other Morrison 
considerations (whether the activity being regulated is economic in nature, 
whether legislative findings speak to the substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, and whether the nexus between interstate commerce and the 
activity being regulated is "attenuated").149  By treating the presence of the 
jurisdictional element as dispositive, the court misapplied the holdings in 
Lopez and Morrison.  Although both courts indicated that the presence of a 
jurisdictional element may be necessary to bring a regulated activity into 
the realm of constitutionality, neither holding suggested that the mere 
presence of a jurisdictional element would be sufficient.150  By striking 
down the gender-motivated violence statute even though it contained 
legislative fact finding, Morrison made clear that none of the four factors 
are sufficient to a finding of constitutionality.151  Conversely, the Lopez 
Court required that the jurisdictional element limit the reach of the 
regulation to those activities that "have an explicit connection with or effect 
on interstate commerce."152 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (regulating those sex offenders who "travel[] in 
interstate commerce and who fail to register their sex offender status"). 
 146. May, 535 F. 3d at 921–22 (quoting Brooks, 267 U.S. at 436 (1925)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 922 (noting that the neither the Gun-Free School Zones Act nor the 
VAWA contained the necessary jurisdictional elements and that "SORNA includes an 
express and clear jurisdictional element for individuals not convicted pursuant to federal 
jurisdiction" (citations omitted)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Although Lopez makes 
clear that such a jurisdictional element would lend support to the argument that § 13981 is 
sufficiently tied to interstate commerce, Congress elected to cast § 13981’s remedy over a 
wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime."). 
 151. See id. at 614 (stating "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so" (citing 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (1995)). 
 152. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (noting that the Gun Free 
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The Eighth Circuit again considered and rejected challenges to the 
constitutionality of SORNA in United States v. Howell.153  Relying on 
previously decided cases, the court quickly dismissed Commerce Clause 
challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B).154  
Although § 16913 is outside of the scope of this Note, the in-depth analysis 
and approach the court takes proves useful.155 
Although the court eventually adopted a broad construction of the 
congressional Commerce Clause powers, it conceded that, "a narrow 
discussion which only analyzes § 16913 under the three categories of Lopez 
casts doubt on the constitutionality of § 16913."156  The court highlighted 
that § 16913 neither contains a jurisdictional element limiting the statute’s 
scope nor is supported by evidence demonstrating that the registration 
requirements substantially affects interstate commerce.157  Nevertheless the 
court concluded that "the broad authority granted to Congress through both 
the Commerce Clause and the enabling necessary and proper clause reveals 
that the statute is constitutionally authorized."158 
The Eighth Circuit looked to the "language, statutory scheme, 
declaration of purpose, and legislative history" of SORNA to hold that that 
the purpose, intent, and focus of SORNA is to regulate the interstate 
movement of sex offenders.159  The court stated that § 16913 was a 
reasonable "means," even if reaching a wholly intrastate sex offender, to 
attain the legitimate "end" of regulating both the channels and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.160  Therefore, the court reasoned 
                                                                                                                 
School Zones Act "has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a 
discrete set of firearm possession that have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce"). 
 153. 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 154. See id. at 713 (stating that the Eighth Circuit has already ruled that § 2250 is 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause and that it will adhere to its previous holding). 
 155. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (requiring that under subsection (a) sex offenders 
register in each jurisdiction where they live, work or go to school and under subsection (c) 
their registration must be updated within three days of changing place of residence, work or 
school).  Section 16913 contains no jurisdictional element and reaches purely intrastate 
activity.  Id. 
 156. Howell, 552 F.3d at 715. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 717. 
 160. See id. ("The registration requirements are reasonably adapted to the legitimate 
end of regulating ‘persons or things in interstate commerce’ and ‘the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce. Covering the registration of wholly interstate sex offenders is merely 
incidental to Congress’s tracking of sex offenders in interstate commerce." (citations 
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that because SORNA was interstate in focus and regulated the "transient 
nature of sex offenders," the purpose or "end" of SORNA must be 
legitimate.161  Accordingly the court reasoned that all means reasonably or 
rationally related to this end are appropriate.162  These underlying 
assumptions not only advance a broad reading of the stated purpose of 
SORNA but also of congressional Commerce Clause powers. 
3.  Tenth Circuit Treatment:  United States v. Hinkley and United States v. 
Lawrance 
On two separate occasions, the Tenth Circuit considered and upheld 
the constitutionality of SORNA.  In United States v. Hinkley, the court 
found SORNA to be easily distinguishable from Lopez and Morrison.163  
Citing May, the court found that SORNA fit into both the first and second 
prongs of Lopez and held that "by requiring that a sex offender travel in 
interstate commerce before finding a registration violation, SORNA 
remains well within the constitutional boundaries of the Commerce 
Clause."164 
One day after the Hinkley opinion was issued, the Tenth Circuit again 
upheld the constitutionality of SORNA in United States v. Lawrance.165  
Judge Kelly thought it was irrelevant whether or not a sex offender’s failure 
to register "substantially affected" interstate commerce; he held that 
SORNA fit comfortably within the first two prongs of Lopez.166  In 
rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge the court concluded, "SORNA 
clearly intends to regulate interstate activity, i.e., the evasion of sex 
                                                                                                                 
omitted)); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819) ("Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). 
 161. United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 162. See id. ("[A]ll means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional." (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819))). 
 163. See United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 940 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing 
the presence of the jurisdictional element found in SORNA and absent from the GFSZA and 
VAWA). 
 164. Id. 
 165. United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (2008). 
 166. Id. at 1337. 
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offender registration requirements by offenders who have crossed 
jurisdictional lines."167 
Both Lawrance and Hinkley construe the scope of the Commerce 
Clause in an unduly broad manner.168  The Tenth Circuit seems to conclude 
that, because the first and second Lopez prongs have traditionally been 
aimed at "keep[ing] the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral 
and injurious uses," congressional regulation of sex offenders, a group of 
individuals typically viewed as "immoral," is permissible.169  What the 
Tenth Circuit fails to recognize, however, is that Congress has not restricted 
the "travel" of offenders in interstate commerce.170  Congress subjects all 
those who have been convicted of a sex offense in state court and who 
have, either before or after their conviction, traveled in interstate commerce 
to the requirements and penalties of § 2250(a)(2)(B).171  However, nothing 
in either the language of § 2250(a)(2)(B) or the legislative history of 
SORNA so much as implies that SORNA seeks to regulate the travel of 
offenders so as to "keep the channels of interstate commerce free from 
immoral and injurious uses."172  Rather, failing to register is the regulated 
activity.173  If such a regulation were sustained, no meaningful limits on 
congressional commerce authority would remain. 
4.  Eleventh Circuit Treatment:  United States v. Ambert and United States 
v. Powers 
The first time that the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a constitutional 
challenge to SORNA, the court ruled in favor of the defendant without 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Id.  
 168. See, e.g., id. (affirming Congress’s right to regulate even the spread of evil if it 
occurs through the channels of interstate commerce). 
 169. See id. (inferring that Congress may regulate sex offenders based on their spread 
of harm and immorality between states (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964))). 
 170. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (requiring sex offenders who travel interstate to register 
or update registration in order to avoid fines and imprisonment). 
 171. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B), (a)(3) ("Whoever . . . travels in interstate 
commerce. . . and . . . knowingly fails to register . . . shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned . . . ."). 
 172. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 256 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)). 
 173. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3) (fining or imprisoning sex offenders who knowingly 
fail to register or update registration after traveling in interstate commerce). 
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reaching the substantive constitutional issues.174  However, the Eleventh 
Circuit subsequently considered and upheld the constitutionality of SORNA 
in United States v. Ambert.175  In Ambert, the court focused on United States 
v. Ballinger,176 in its decision.177  Ballinger upheld the constitutionality of a 
statute that criminalized church-based arson where the "offense is in or 
affects interstate or foreign commerce."178  The Ballinger court reasoned 
that congressional power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce includes "the power to prohibit their use for harmful 
purposes, even if the targeted harm itself occurs outside the flow of 
commerce and is purely local in nature."179  Further, the court in Ballinger 
noted that this power includes the "power to reach criminal conduct in 
which the illegal acts ultimately occur intrastate, when the perpetrator uses 
the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to facilitate their 
commission."180 
Applying Ballinger, the court found that because § 2250(a)(2)(B) 
contains the requisite jurisdictional element and focuses on offenders who 
travel in interstate commerce, the "use of the channels and instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce is necessarily part of the commission of the targeted 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2250."181  The court further reasoned that 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) is indistinguishable from either Ballinger or the Mann Act 
and that § 2250(a)(2)(B) "does no more than employ Congress’ lawful 
                                                                                                                 
 174. See United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 859 (11th. Cir. 2008) (holding that 
"[b]ecause [defendant’s] indictment concerns his failure to register during the gap period 
between SORNA’s enactment and the Attorney General’s retroactivity determination, 
[defendant] cannot be prosecuted for violating SORNA during that time"). 
 175. See United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1210 (11th. Cir. 2009) (finding that 
§ 2250(a) "is a proper regulation falling under either of the first two Lopez categories 
because it regulates both the use of channels of interstate commerce and the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce"). 
 176. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1219, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(holding that Congress’s commerce authority includes the power to punish a church arsonist 
who uses the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce). 
 177. See Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1210–11 ("This Court further explained the proper 
boundaries of Congress’ ability to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce in United States v. Ballinger . . . ."). 
 178. See id. at 1211 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 247(b) and recognizing that Congress has 
used its power to enact similar statutes which prevent harmful action based on its ability to 
control the channels and instrumentalities of commerce). 
 179. Id. (quoting Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1226). 
 180. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1226). 
 181. United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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commerce power to prohibit the use of channels or instrumentalities of 
commerce for harmful purposes."182 
By stating that the "use of the channels and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce is necessarily part of the commission of the targeted 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2250,"183 the court plainly errs.  As previously 
discussed, § 2250(a)(2)(B) remains distinct from the Mann Act.184  Section 
2250(a)(2)(B) merely requires that the sex offender travel in interstate 
commerce.185  Conversely, the Mann Act requires that the travel in 
interstate commerce be with "intent that such individual engage in 
prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged 
with a criminal offense . . . ."186  By including the intent restriction the 
Mann Act regulates only that conduct directly related to interstate 
commerce. 
The statute upheld in Ballinger requires that the offense either be "in" 
interstate commerce or "affect" interstate commerce.187  Although these 
restrictions do not impose an explicit intent restriction, the connection 
between the activity being regulated and interstate commerce must be 
direct.188  In effect, the statute in Ballinger places temporal restrictions on 
the connection between interstate commerce and the activity being 
regulated.  In no way does the statute purport to suggest that if an arsonist 
had at one time traveled in interstate commerce that he would, 
automatically and permanently, be subjected to federal regulation.  
However, under § 2250(a)(2)(B), if an offender at any time before or after 
the commission of the underlying crime has traveled in interstate 
commerce, he is subject to the statutory requirements of SORNA.189  
                                                                                                                 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See supra Part III.B.1 (finding that because the Mann Act requires that the travel 
in interstate commerce be with the intent to commit a crime it is distinct from § 2250(a)). 
 185. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) ("[T]ravels in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country . . . ."). 
 186. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421 ("Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate 
or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that 
such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be 
charged with a criminal offense . . . ."). 
 187. See 18 U.S.C. § 247(b) (providing that "[t]he circumstances referred to in 
subsection (a) are that the offense is in or affect interstate or foreign commerce"). 
 188. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1219, 1228 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) 
("[Section] 247 contains an explicit requirement of an appropriate nexus with interest 
commerce, so that church arson may be prosecuted only when ‘the offense is in or affects 
interstate or foreign commerce.’" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 247(b))). 
 189. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) ("(a) In general. —Whoever—(1) is required to 
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Section 2250(a)(2)(B) does not require that the travel in interstate 
commerce be for harmful purposes.190  By failing to require that the travel 
in interstate commerce be in some way related to the offense, 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) is distinct from the statute upheld in Ballinger.  
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit expands the scope of both the first and 
second Lopez categories. 
In the most recent appellate court decision, the Eleventh Circuit 
again upheld the constitutionality of SORNA.  The Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. Powers,191 reversed a strong district court opinion.192  
The district court found the failure to register statute to be criminal and 
non-economic in nature, the jurisdictional element to be void of 
substance and accordingly, and that § 2250(a)(2)(B) lacked the 
necessary nexus to interstate commerce.193  The Eleventh Circuit 
reiterated its holding in Ambert:  "Ambert controls here.  The district 
court erred in dismissing the indictment against Powers on the ground 
that SORNA exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause."194 
C.  Federal District Court Treatment of the Commerce Clause 
Challenges to SORNA 
A large number of district courts have considered Commerce 
Clause challenges to SORNA.195  The vast majority of those courts find 
                                                                                                                 
register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act . . . (2)(B) travels in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian Country . . . ."). 
 190. See id. (neglecting to include any language on harmful purpose). 
 191. See United States v. Powers, 562 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(holding the registration provisions of SORNA do not violate the Commerce Clause and fall 
within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce). 
 192. See id. ("The district court erred in dismissing the indictment against Powers on 
the ground that SORNA exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.").  
 193. See United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2008) ("If an 
individual’s mere unrelated travel in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a 
Commerce Clause nexus with purely local conduct, then virtually all criminal activity would 
be subject to the power of the federal government."). 
 194. Id. at 1343. 
 195. See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and 
the Commerce Clause, 21 FED. SENT’G. REP. 133, 134 (2008) [hereinafter The Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce Clause] ("As of October 12, 2008, at 
least fifty-four district courts have issued opinions on a Commerce Clause challenge."). 
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that SORNA falls within Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.196  
Although the percentage of courts that have upheld the constitutionality 
of SORNA is overwhelming, the underlying analysis for such 
conclusions is often misapplied and varies widely.197 
1.  District Courts Finding that § 2250(a)(2)(B) Is a Permissible Exercise 
of Congressional Commerce Clause Power 
The majority of district courts have rejected Commerce Clause 
challenges to § 2250(a)(2)(B) by finding that the activity being regulated 
fits into the second Lopez prong—instrumentalities of commerce or persons 
or things in interstate commerce.198  Analyzing the regulated activity under 
the second Lopez category, the court in United States v. Ditomasso199 was 
satisfied that the presence of the jurisdictional element in SORNA 
adequately distinguished the statute in Lopez and Morrison and 
accordingly, upheld the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B).200  In 
supporting this conclusion, the court surmised that an activity being 
regulated under the second Lopez category is required to be neither 
economic in nature nor contain a specific element requiring that the 
interstate travel be with the intent not to register.201 
In United States v. Vardaro,202 the district court upheld the 
constitutionality of SORNA relying on the second Lopez category.203  As 
the majority of federal district courts have done, the Vardaro court 
emphasized the presence of the jurisdictional element limiting SORNA 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See id. at 134 ("Only three of those fifty-four opinions have found that SORNA 
was not a proper exercise of federal power."). 
 197. See id. ("While courts have largely been consistent in rejecting Commerce Clause 
challenges, the reasons offered and methodology employed have varied widely."). 
 198. See id. (relaying the fact that most courts have found SORNA justified under the 
second prong of the Lopez analysis). 
 199. See United States v. Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 233, 247 (D.R.I. 2008) (finding 
§ 2250 a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause). 
 200. See id. at 245–46 (finding that § 2250(a) is "clearly constitutional" under the 
second Lopez prong); see also id. at 246 (distinguishing Lopez and Morrison).  
 201. See id. at 246–47 (noting both that the Court in Lopez allowed Congress to 
regulate "persons . . . in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities" and that defendant lacks the necessary legal authority demonstrating that 
"intent is a necessary element of the second prong"). 
 202. See United States v. Vardaro, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1185 (D. Mont. 2008) 
(upholding the constitutionality of SORNA under the second prong of the Lopez test). 
 203. Id. 
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prosecutions to those who have traveled in interstate commerce.204  These 
two cases serve only as two of the many examples of district courts 
upholding the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B) under the second prong 
of Lopez.205 
Additionally, numerous federal district courts have analyzed and 
upheld § 2250(a)(2)(B) under the third Lopez category.  For example, in 
United States v. Holt,206 the Southern District of Iowa concluded, "[a] 
rational basis exists for concluding that the activity regulated by SORNA 
substantially affects interstate commerce."207  Similarly, in United States v. 
Madera,208 the district court sustained a § 2250(a)(2)(B) challenge under 
the third Lopez prong and reasoned that Congress’s desire to track sex 
offenders as they move between states satisfies the rational basis test 
articulated in Raich.209 
Of those courts striking down SORNA as an unconstitutional violation 
of congressional Commerce Clause powers, many have done so without 
specifically declaring § 2250(a)(2)(B) unconstitutional.  Rather, these 
courts have struck down SORNA by declaring unconstitutional the 
registration provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16913.210  Courts have held 
that, unlike § 2250(a)(2)(B), § 16913 neither contains the requisite 
jurisdictional element nor regulates the channels or instrumentalities of 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See id. at 1186 ("SORNA’s criminal provision at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 contains an 
appropriate jurisdictional element which expressly limits SORNA prosecutions to those 
individuals who have traveled in interstate commerce.  [This shows] Congress was acutely 
aware of the breadth of its power . . . ."). 
 205. See 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d 213, supra note 54 (listing cases considering the 
constitutionality and application of SORNA). 
 206. See United States v. Holt, No. 3:07-cr-0630-JAJ, 2008 WL 1776495, at *3 (S.D. 
Iowa Apr. 14, 2008) (upholding the constitutionality of SORNA under the third Lopez prong 
(citing United States v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005))). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See United States v. Madera, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(finding the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 constitutional). 
 209. See id. at 1265 ("This rational basis test [laid out in Raich] is clearly met through 
Congress’s desire to track sex offenders as they move between states, in order to promote the 
public safety."). 
 210. See, e.g., United States v. Waybright, 561 F. Supp. 2d. 1154, 1165 (D. Mont. 
2008) (holding that though § 2250(a) is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, § 16913 regulated all sex offenders regardless of whether they traveled in 
interstate commerce and, therefore, was not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause); United States v. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(holding that though § 2250(a) was constitutional under the Commerce Clause, § 16913 is 
unconstitutional because it lacks a jurisdictional element and applies to all sex offenders 
regardless of whether they travel in interstate commerce). 
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interstate commerce.211  Consequently, most of these courts have dismissed 
defendants’ indictments reasoning that "a conviction under § 2250(a) is 
invalid because the criminal penalty statute demands the Government prove 
the defendant was required to register under § 16913."212  However, while 
the court in United States v. Thomas,213 concluded that § 16913 was an 
impermissible exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, it upheld 
the indictment as valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause.214  The 
position taken in Thomas is unique.215  With the exception of Thomas, 
regardless of the statutory provision deemed unsustainable under commerce 
authority, the effect is the same—the defendant’s indictment is dismissed. 
2.  District Courts Finding § 2250(a)(2)(B) to Be an Impermissible Exercise 
of Congressional Commerce Clause Power 
A growing minority of federal courts have found § 2250(a)(2)(B) to be 
an impermissible exercise of congressional Commerce Clause powers.  
Before being overturned by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Powers, 
the district court held that § 2250(a)(2)(B) could not be justified under any 
of the Lopez categories.216  Focusing its analysis on the third Lopez prong, 
the court found that the statute was criminal in nature and did not deal with 
commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.217  Powers opined that the 
supposed "jurisdictional element" was naked, superficial, and did not bring 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d 610, 620 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(finding that a conviction under § 16913 "raises greater constitutional concern than 
§ 2250(a) because it lacks a jurisdictional element restricting its application to individuals 
who travel in interstate commerce"). 
 212. See id. at 622 (finding that the interrelatedness between § 2250 and § 16913 
demands that neither be upheld under the Commerce Clause due to the lack of any 
connection to interstate commerce in § 16913). 
 213. See United States v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (holding 
§ 16913 constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 214. See id. at 920–22 (broadening the application of § 16913 under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause). 
 215. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d 305, 314 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(finding that §16913 is neither constitutional under the Commerce Clause nor a "reasonably 
adapted means to achieve a constitutional objective" and, therefore, rejecting the Necessary 
and Proper Clause argument accepted in Thomas). 
 216. See United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1334–45 (M.D. Fla. 2008) 
("Like the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, SORNA has nothing to do with 
commerce or any form of economic enterprise."). 
 217. See id. at 1335 ("SORNA has nothing to do with commerce or any form of 
economic enterprise."). 
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§ 2250(a)(2)(B) into the realm of constitutionality—the Commerce Clause 
requires more than "statutory ‘lip service’ to interstate commerce."218  In so 
reasoning, the court noted that "[i]f an individual’s mere unrelated travel in 
interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a Commerce Clause nexus 
with purely local conduct, then virtually all criminal activity would be 
subject to the power of the federal government.  Surely our founding fathers 
did not contemplate such a broad view of federalism."219  Despite the sound 
reasoning by this district court, the Eleventh Circuit, bound by its prior 
holding in United States v. Ambert, reversed the district court and found 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) to be a permissible exercise of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority.220 
For the Southern District of Florida, Chief Judge Zloch, in United 
States v. Myers,221 held that both § 16913 and § 2250(a)(2)(B) violated the 
Commerce Clause.222  With regard to § 2250(a)(2)(B), the court concluded: 
Contrary to Powers, the Court finds that by enacting § 2250 Congress 
did not attempt to regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  Rather, the statute’s language regulates sex offenders who 
have traveled in interstate commerce.  Congress, however, has no power 
to regulate a person simply because at some earlier time he has traveled 
in interstate commerce.  Therefore . . . the Court will grant the instant 
Motion To Dismiss Indictment . . . .223 
In so holding, the court focused on the first two Lopez prongs.  
Looking at the first Lopez category, Chief Judge Zloch acknowledged that 
Congress may regulate the channels of interstate commerce by 
"criminalizing the travel of those who carry a proscribed intent or article" 
but concluded that Congress "may not attach regulations on a person simply 
because he has once innocently availed himself of his constitutional right 
through the channels of interstate commerce."224  He reasoned that the first 
                                                                                                                 
 218. Id. 
 219. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; see also 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d. 213, supra note 54 
(quoting Powers). 
 220. See United States v. Powers, 562 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding 
§ 2250(a) to be a permissible exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority). 
 221. See United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1349–50 (S.D. Fla. 2008) 
(holding that enactment of SORNA exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and 
defendant’s interstate travel did not have sufficient impact on interest commerce to permit 
his prosecution). 
 222. See id. (holding that both § 16913 and § 2250(a) impermissibly exceed Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers). 
 223. Id. at 1317. 
 224. Id. at 1348. 
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Lopez category permits Congress to regulate interstate commerce by 
"barring from its channels a certain class of goods or people that it deems 
harmful."225  The first Lopez prong operates to exclude those objects or 
persons whose "movement across state lines [is] with the proscribed 
purpose or status."226  The first Lopez category focuses on regulating the 
actual movement through interstate commerce.227 
Conversely, § 2250(a)(2)(B) focuses on criminalizing a sex offender’s 
failure to register.  The statute does not regulate the travel of sex offenders, 
for it neither bars offenders from the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce nor restricts their use by including an intent limitation.228  
Finally, § 2250(a)(2)(B) fails to include a temporal restriction that limits an 
offender’s period of federal regulation to those times in which he is "using" 
or is "in" interstate commerce.229  By correctly placing emphasis on the 
actual movement through the channels of interstate commerce, the court 
properly rejected the argument that § 2250(a)(2)(B) regulated activity 
pursuant to the first Lopez prong.230 
The court then looked to the purpose and language of the second Lopez 
prong.  The language of the second prong reads, "Congress is empowered 
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come 
only from intrastate activities."231  The Southern District of Florida found 
that the purpose of the second Lopez category was to address "Congress’s 
power to regulate and protect such persons from threats while traveling or 
about to travel in interstate commerce."232  The second prong regulates the 
"means of conveying people and goods across state lines."233  It does not 
                                                                                                                 
 225. Id. at 1328 (citing United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288–89 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(Alito, J., dissenting)). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. ("By excluding certain persons from the channels of interstate commerce, 
the focus of the prohibition is on the person or thing’s movement across state lines with the 
proscribed purpose."). 
 228. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (restricting only the manner in which the sex 
offenders must register). 
 229. See id. (failing to include any time restrictions in the statute). 
 230. See United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1349-50 (S.D. Fla. 2008) 
(finding § 2250 "is in no way a regulation of persons in interstate commerce"). 
 231. Id. at 1348 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 
(1995)). 
 232. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added). 
 233. Id. at 1341 (quoting United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288–89 (Alito, J., 
dissenting)). 
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operate to allow Congress to regulate any person who has, at one point or 
another, traveled across state lines.234 
Chief Judge Zloch correctly states that the courts which have relied on 
the second Lopez category to sustain § 2250(a)(2)(B) "have interpreted the 
phrase ‘persons in interstate commerce’ to give Congress plenary 
jurisdiction over a person once he has traveled in interstate commerce."235  
Rather than acquiescing to increased judicial justification of 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) under the second category, the Southern District of Florida 
concludes that language and historical use of the second Lopez category "is 
addressed to Congress’s power to regulate and protect such persons from 
threats while traveling in interstate commerce.  It involves things ‘actually 
being moved in interstate commerce, not all people and things that have 
ever moved across state lines.’"236  Applying this standard, the court 
concludes that § 2250(a)(2)(B) impermissibly exceeds the scope of 
congressional commerce authority. 
IV.  Evaluating Commerce Clause Challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) 
A.  The Economic/Non-economic Distinction and the Appropriate Level of 
Deference to Be Accorded Congressional Findings of Fact 
1.  Level of Deference Accorded to Congressional Fact-Finding in Recent 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
As a preliminary matter, one must consider the level of deference to be 
accorded to congressional fact-finding.  Breaking from prior Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, the Court in Lopez and Morrison omitted any explicit 
reference to the amount of deference given to congressional fact-finding.237  
                                                                                                                 
 234. See id. at 1329 (stating that regulation under the second Lopez category "does not 
mean that once a person has traveled in interstate commerce a regulation is attached to 
him"). 
 235. United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 236. Id. at 1348 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 
622 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 237. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 613 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
("[Congressional findings] tell us what Congress actually has found, not what it could 
rationally find.  If, indeed, the Court were to make the existence of explicit congressional 
findings dispositive in some close or difficult cases something other than rationality review 
would be afoot."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("[T]he 
existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality 
of Commerce Clause legislation."). 
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Nonetheless, the Lopez decision implies some form of heightened judicial 
review; Rehnquist appears to qualify rational basis review and to treat 
"deference under the rationality rule as subject to gradation according to the 
commercial or noncommercial nature of the immediate subject of the 
challenged regulation."238  Additionally, Lopez implies that if Congress had 
provided legislative findings regarding the effect on interstate commerce, 
some increased deference to Congress might be entertained.239  By 
announcing that the Court will independently evaluate constitutionality 
under the Commerce Clause, the question was not whether Congress could 
have rationally concluded that the Gun Free School Zones Act or the 
Violence Against Women Act substantially affected interstate commerce, 
but rather, whether those statutes actually had a substantial affect on 
interstate commerce.240  In Morrison, the Court echoed Lopez, providing 
that "whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently 
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is 
ultimately a judicial rather than legislative question, and can be settled 
finally only by this Court."241 
 Conversely, the Court in Raich, by applying a rational basis level of 
review, accorded Congress great deference.242  The Court distinguished 
Lopez and Morrison by stating that the regulated activities in the earlier 
cases were non-economic in nature and outside of the scope of 
                                                                                                                 
 238. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 239. See id. at 562 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) ("Although as a part of our 
independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course 
consider legislative findings, and  indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding 
effect on interstate commerce[.]"); but see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–16 
(2000) (rejecting Congress’s findings even though VAWA is supported by numerous 
statistics regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims, and 
noting that determining whether an activity contains the sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce is a judicial rather than legislative question). 
 240. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 ("But to the extent that congressional findings would 
enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question 
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was 
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here."). 
 241. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (2000) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241, 273 (1964)). 
 242. See United States v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2006) ("In assessing the scope of 
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a 
modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for 
so concluding."). 
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congressional Commerce Clause power.243  Although the level of deference 
accorded in Raich cannot be ignored, a narrow reading of Raich suggests 
that the level of scrutiny applied to § 2250(a)(2)(B) turns on whether the 
activity is commercial or non-commercial in nature. 
2.  Application of Appropriate Scrutiny to § 2250(a)(2)(B):  The 
Economic/Non-economic Distinction 
No reading of the activity being regulated in § 2250(a)(2)(B) could 
possibly suggest that "travel" in interstate commerce is "economic" or 
"commercial in nature."  In adopting an expansive construction of the term 
"economic," the majority in Raich states "‘[e]conomics’ refers to ‘the 
production, distribution and consumption of commodities.’"244  Section 
2250(a)(2)(B) is criminal rather than economic in nature.  Even this 
expansive definition of economics cannot include creating a federal 
criminal penalty for sex offenders who violate their registration 
requirements.  The stated purpose of SORNA is to protect the public from 
sex offenders.245  In an effort to accomplish this goal, SORNA criminalizes 
a convicted sex offender’s failure to register.246  According to the language 
of Lopez and Morrison, neither the means (criminalizing the failure to 
register) nor the larger end (public safety) can be considered economic in 
nature.247  Any "costs of crime" or similar economic argument will be 
deemed, as required by Lopez, "too attenuated."248 
                                                                                                                 
 243. See id. at 25 ("Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated 
by the CSA are quintessentially economic."). 
 244. Id. at 26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 
(1966)). 
 245. See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 ("In order to protect the public from sex offenders and 
offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against 
the victims listed below, Congress in this chapter establishes a comprehensive national 
system for the registration of those offenders."). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (finding that simple gun 
possession is not an economic activity because it "is not an essential part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated"); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 
(2000) ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity. . . . [T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause 
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature."). 
 248. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–64 (rejecting the "costs of crime" argument as too 
attenuated); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that 
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
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Like the GFSZA, § 2250(a)(2)(B) is a "criminal statute that by its 
terms has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic 
enterprise . . . ."249  Further, like the GFSZA, § 2250(a)(2)(B) "is not an 
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated."250  Although § 2250(a)(2)(B) is a part of the Adam Walsh Act, 
in no way can the federal failure to register provision as applied to 
convicted state sex offenders be deemed  "essential" to the survival of the 
AWA.  Accepting that § 2250(a)(2)(B) is akin to the non-economic 
activities that were being regulated in Lopez and Morrison and distinct from 
the "quintessentially economic" activity being regulated in Raich, courts 
should apply the more searching level of judicial scrutiny utilized in Lopez 
and Morrison.  When analyzing the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B), 
courts should focus on whether the activity actually possesses the requisite 
nexus to interstate commerce, not whether Congress could have rationally 
concluded that such a nexus exists. 
B.  Analyzing Potential Commerce Clause Arguments and § 2250(a)(2)(B) 
Under the Three Lopez Prongs 
As previously stated, the Supreme Court has "identified three broad 
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce 
power."251  Section 2250(a)(2)(B) has been analyzed primarily under the 
second category, but has also been sustained under the third Lopez 
category.  The following discussion will consider which, if any, of the 
Lopez categories can uphold the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B).  This 
Part concludes that none of the three permissible categories for regulation 
can support the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B). 
1.  Congress’s Ability to Regulate the "Channels of Interstate Commerce" 
First, "Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce."252  As of this writing, no Supreme Court jurisprudence defines 
                                                                                                                 
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce."). 
 249. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 250. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005). 
 251. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 276–77 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)). 
 252. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
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the scope of congressional commerce authority under this category.253  
Historically, however, Commerce Clause jurisprudence sustained 
congressional regulations under this category in an effort to keep the 
channels "‘free from immoral or injurious uses.’"254  In essence, the first 
Lopez category allows Congress to "‘exclude from the commerce [those 
things] whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive 
to be injurious to public health, morals or welfare.’"255  In defining the 
scope of this category, the Court in United States v. Caminenti,256 stated, 
"[i]t may be conceded, for the purpose of this argument, that Congress has 
no power to punish one who travels in interstate commerce merely because 
he has the intention of committing an illegal or immoral act at the 
conclusion of his journey . . . .  It seeks to reach and punish the movement 
in interstate commerce . . . ."257 
Accepting Caminenti, the dispositive inquiry is what Congress 
seeks to punish. Congress can regulate the channels of interstate 
commerce so that their use is neither immoral nor injurious.  To 
accomplish this stated goal, Congress is free to regulate the travel or 
actual movement of persons or things through the channels of interstate 
commerce; however, Congress may not regulate immoral or injurious 
conduct committed once the individual has reached his destination.  If 
Congress could regulate any individual who has ever, at one point in 
his life, "used" the channels of interstate commerce, the Commerce 
Clause would impose no meaningful constraints upon the powers of 
the federal government. 
The language of § 2250(a)(2)(B) regulates those sex offenders 
who "travel[] in interstate commerce."258  Determining the activity that 
is being regulated is pivotal to an analysis of the first Lopez category.  
Here, the jurisdictional element purporting to furnish § 2250(a)(2)(B) 
with the requisite nexus to interstate commerce does not criminalize or 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–34 (2005) (summarizing Supreme Court 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and stating that "our cases have mechanically recited that 
the Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation" of the channels of interstate 
commerce, implying this category’s lack of definition (emphasis added)). 
 254. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 255. United States v. Myers 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (quoting 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)). 
 256. See generally Caminenti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (affirming two 
appellate court decisions affirming convictions under the White Slave Traffic Act). 
 257. Id. at 491 (emphasis added). 
 258. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B). 
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regulate the act of travel; rather the travel in interstate commerce is 
"divorced from the criminal act of knowingly failing to register as a 
sex offender."259  The jurisdictional element is regulatory in nature.  
The jurisdictional element is merely an administrative regulation for 
prosecuting individuals for failing to register and only requires that the 
sex offender has traveled, at some undefined time, in interstate 
commerce.260  The lack of any temporal or intent requirements attached 
to the jurisdictional element demonstrates that Congress did not intend 
to regulate the movement of sex offenders in interstate commerce as is 
required under the first prong.  Congress can regulate the channels of 
interstate commerce by prohibiting persons with a proscribed intent 
from traveling through the channels, but it cannot regulate the local 
activity that the person partakes in once he has ceased traveling in 
interstate commerce.  Section 2250(a)(2)(B) cannot be sustained under 
this first Lopez category. 
2.  Congress’s Ability to Regulate and Protect "the Instrumentalities of 
Interstate Commerce, or Persons or Things in Interstate Commerce, 
Even Though the Threat May Come from Only Intrastate Activities" 
The second category, although wrongly relied on by a majority of 
courts, does not justify the enactment of § 2250(a)(2)(B).  The 
language reads, "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities."261  The issued opinions relying upon the second 
Lopez category seem to suggest that once a person has traveled across 
state lines, Congress is free to regulate that individual in any way it 
sees fit.  For example, the district court in Mason held that Congress is 
empowered to "regulate those individuals or things that travel in 
interstate commerce without regard to the reason for their 
                                                                                                                 
 259. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. 
 260. See id. at 1335 (finding that rather than containing any jurisdictional element, the 
statute is a "blanket regulation falling upon all sex offenders, whether or not they have 
traveled across state lines or whether or not they undertake any action related to interstate 
commerce"). 
 261. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
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movement."262  As the court in United States v. Myers suggests, this 
construction is unduly broad.263 
Although the jurisdictional element found in § 2250(a)(2)(B) 
technically makes a sex offender a "person . . . in interstate 
commerce," this seeming compliance is not sufficient.  Particularly 
important is the complete lack of temporality associated with the 
jurisdictional element.  By failing to either include a temporality or 
intent restriction, the nexus between failing to register and the activity 
being regulated disappears.  An intent restriction would limit 
regulation to those sex offenders who traveled across state lines with 
the intent to evade registration requirements.  Similarly, a temporal 
restriction would limit regulation to those sex offenders whose travel 
in interstate commerce was contemporaneous with their failure to 
register.  Both temporal and intent restrictions would serve to create 
the necessary nexus between interstate commerce and the activity 
being regulated—the failure to register. 
In addition to the lack of any temporal or intent-based element, 
reading the second Lopez category in totality rather than in isolation 
reveals that § 2250(a)(2)(B) does not fit into the second category.  
Gibbs v. Babbitt,264 a Fourth Circuit case speaking to Congress’s power 
under this second Lopez category, is illustrative.265  In Gibbs, the 
Fourth Circuit stated that, although the red wolves in question had 
been transported through interstate commerce, that alone is not 
sufficient to make them a "thing" in interstate commerce.266  
Analogously, although the sex offenders have traveled in interstate 
commerce, that alone should not be enough to make them "persons" in 
interstate commerce.  In sum, "[t]his category, as evidenced by the 
cases cited as exemplars, consists of Congress’s power over the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, like planes and trains.  
Section 2250 does not concern such instrumentalities of interstate 
                                                                                                                 
 262. United States v. Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d 923, 932 (M.D. Fla. 2007).  
 263. See United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ("By 
articulating the categories in Lopez, the Supreme Court did not create new powers for 
Congress beyond those it traditionally enjoyed.  It simply formulated a convenient rhetorical 
tool for lower courts and practitioners alike to quickly identify the historically accepted 
forms of Congress’s Commerce Clause power." (internal citation omitted)). 
 264. See Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 506 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a regulation 
limiting the taking of wolves on private land was valid under the Commerce Clause). 
 265. See id. at 491 (declining to find that wolves that have been transported through 
interstate commerce constitute a "thing" within interstate commerce).  
 266. Id. 
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commerce or the carriage of persons on such instrumentalities."267  
Section 2250(a)(2)(B) does not implicate the second Lopez prong. 
3.  Congress’s Ability to Regulate Those Things that Have a "Substantial 
Effect" on Interstate Commerce 
An analysis under the third Lopez category proves similarly 
problematic.  The Court in Morrison articulated four factors speaking to 
whether a regulated activity has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.268  With regard to this third category, Morrison directs courts to 
consider:  (1) whether the activity being regulated is commercial or 
economic in nature; (2) whether the statute contains a jurisdictional element 
to limit its scope; (3) whether congressional findings reflect effects upon 
interstate commerce; and (4) whether the nexus of link between the activity 
being regulated and interstate commerce is attenuated.269  Applying these 
four factors, § 2250(a)(2)(B) cannot be said to have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. 
First, as discussed in Part III (A)(2), the activity being regulated is not 
economic in nature.270  Although finding that criminalizing the failure to 
register is "non-economic" does not per se bring the statute outside of the 
realm of constitutionality, the Court disfavors aggregation of the individual 
instances of non-economic conduct.271  In disallowing the aggregation of 
the individual incidents of conduct, the Morrison Court states:  "While we 
need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any 
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s 
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate 
activity only where that activity is economic in nature."272  The above 
excerpt articulates that the Court not only strongly disapproves of the 
aggregation of individual instances of conduct, but also that no regulation 
of a non-economic intrastate activity has ever been sustained. 
                                                                                                                 
 267. United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2008).  
 268. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–12 (2000). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes and text. 
 271. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (finding it dispositive that "[g]ender-motivated 
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity"). 
 272. Id. 
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Separation of powers underlies this result.273  Allowing the aggregation 
of individual instances of non-economic conduct would undermine the 
police power reserved to the states.  Justice Thomas reasoned, "we always 
have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal 
power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power[.]"274  
Rationalizing that, in the aggregate, a sex offender’s failure to register has a 
substantial affect on interstate commerce would, undeniably, allow 
Congress to exercise a police power. 
Second, although § 2250(a)(2)(B) contains an express jurisdictional 
element, the jurisdictional element is insufficient; the jurisdictional element 
regulates far too broad a swath of conduct.275  Morrison requires that the 
jurisdictional element either:  (a) limit the reach of the statute to the conduct 
that has an "explicit connection with or effect on, interstate commerce," or 
(b) that the jurisdictional element "establish that the enactment is in 
pursuance of Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce."276  As 
suggested by the Middle District of Florida in United States v. Powers,277 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) neither limits the reach of the failure to register provision 
to those offenders with an explicit connection to, or effect on, interstate 
commerce, nor establishes that § 2250(a)(2)(B) is pursuant to Congress’s 
power to regulate commerce.278  First, lacking the necessary intent and 
temporal requirements, the jurisdictional element can hardly be considered 
limiting—those offenders who have traveled at any time and for any reason 
in interstate commerce are subjected § 2250(a)(2)(B).279  Second, in no way 
                                                                                                                 
 273. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (finding that the 
Constitution requires "a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local" 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 274. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
 275. See, e.g., The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce 
Clause, supra note 195, at 136 ("The limits [of the jurisdictional element] must correspond 
with the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Congress cannot merely include the magic words 
‘interstate commerce’ (which it did not even do in SORNA) and expend the limit to be 
adequate."). 
 276. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000). 
 277. United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
 278. See id. at 1335 (stating that the jurisdictional element in § 2250(a)(2)(B) neither 
limits the reach of the statute to that conduct which has an explicit connection with or effect 
on interstate commerce nor establishes that the statute is in pursuance of congressional 
power to regulate interstate commerce). 
 279. See The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce Clause, 
supra note 195, at 136 ("In the case of § 2250(a)(2)(B), the jurisdictional language is 
insufficient because it includes no temporal connection between travel and failing to register, 
and prior travel does not inherently have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."). 
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can regulating all offenders who have, at one point or another, traveled in 
interstate commerce substantially affect interstate commerce.280  The 
jurisdictional element fails to furnish the necessary ties or nexus between an 
offender’s failing to register and interstate travel.281  A jurisdictional 
element must not be naked or superficial; a jurisdictional element must be 
more than "statutory lip service"; merely including the words "who have 
traveled in interstate commerce" does not satisfy the demands of the 
Commerce Clause.282  Third, "SORNA’s legislative history lacks any clear 
congressional findings concerning the effect of sex offender registration 
upon interstate commerce."283  Congress’s failure to include any 
congressional findings assessing the relationship between a sex offender’s 
failure to register and interstate commerce lends further support for the 
notion that § 2250(a)(2)(B) impermissibly exceeds the scope of 
congressional authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause.284  Finally, the 
fourth Morrison consideration asks courts to consider whether the link 
between that which is being regulated and the effect on commerce is 
attenuated.285  As discussed with respect to the second Morrison 
consideration, by failing to include either intent or temporal restrictions, 
Congress cannot rationally claim that criminalizing a sex offenders’ failure 
to register under § 2250(a)(2)(B) has more than an attenuated nexus to 
interstate commerce.286 
                                                                                                                 
 280. See Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d. at 1335 (internal quotations omitted) ("The mere fact 
that the individual has, at some point, traveled in interstate commerce does not establish that 
his or her subsequent failure to register substantially affects interstate commerce"). 
 281. See id. ("[Section] 2250(a) does contain a ‘jurisdictional element’ which purports 
to establish a link between the failure to register as a sex offender and interstate 
commerce . . . this supposed link is superficial and insufficient to support a finding of 
substantial affect on interstate commerce."). 
 282. See id. ("[T]his supposed link is superficial . . . [t]he Commerce 
Clause . . . require[s] more than statutory lip service to interstate commerce . . . [t]he mere 
fact that the individual has, at some point, traveled in interstate commerce does not establish 
that . . . [he] substantially affects interstate commerce."). 
 283. United States v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d 305, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 284. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) ("While Congress 
normally is not required to make formal findings . . . the existence of such findings may 
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially 
affect[s] interstate commerce." (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
 285. See id. ("Finally, our decision in Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link 
between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated."). 
 286. The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce Clause, 
supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT 527 
In no meaningful way can § 2250(a)(2)(B) be considered an economic 
activity.287  The relationship between criminalizing a sex offender’s failure 
to register and commerce is in no way direct.  Because § 2250(a)(2)(B) is 
non-economic in nature, the individual instances of conduct cannot be 
aggregated when determining whether substantial effect on interstate 
commerce exists.288  Each individual instance of conduct must substantially 
affect interstate commerce.289  Even if a court were to apply a rational basis 
level of review, § 2250(a)(2)(B) cannot be sustained under the third Lopez 
category. 
V.  Conclusion 
Although all four circuit courts reaching the substantive issue have 
upheld the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B), a careful examination of 
existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence intimates the opposite conclusion.  
When considering the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B), courts should 
engage in more than a perfunctory, result-oriented analysis.  Increased 
judicial approval of § 2250(a)(2)(B) not only exposes sex offenders to the 
unduly burdensome and disproportional failure to register penalties but 
also, "signal[s] an important shift in what the Lopez Court called the 
‘sensitive relation between federal state and state jurisdiction.’"290  Even 
after its decision in Raich, it seems that if the Court were to uphold 
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers, it would have to overturn Lopez and Morrison.  Stare decisis and a 
faithful interpretation of the Constitution should prohibit this result. 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence concludes that the Court should apply 
rational basis review for most economic Commerce Clause cases.291  
However, Lopez and Morrison suggest that when legislation affects 
                                                                                                                 
 287. Supra Part IV.A.2. 
 288. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress 
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s 
aggregate effect on interstate commerce."). 
 289. See id. at 613 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the 
effects of noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s 
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of interstate activity only where 
that activity is economic in nature."). 
 290. Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16, at 9. 
 291. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964)("[W]here we find that 
the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for 
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our 
investigation is at an end."). 
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individual’s rights, the Court should give less deference to Congress.  The 
level of review turns on whether the legislation is economic in nature.  Even 
accepting the broad definition of "economic" employed in Raich, in no way 
can § 2250(a)(2)(B) be considered economic or commercial in nature.  
Therefore, when considering the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B), the 
Court should apply a more searching level of review.  Considering, as the  
Court did in Lopez and Morrison, whether § 2250(a)(2)(B) actually falls 
within the purview of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers requires a 
court to find that the legislation is unconstitutional.292  Any meaningful 
Commerce Clause analysis reveals that § 2250(a)(2)(B) regulates neither 
the channels nor the instrumentalities of commerce.  Finally, any argument 
that § 2250(a)(2)(B) has a substantial affect on interstate commerce is 
simply too attenuated.  Even the most expansive constructions of 
congressional commerce authority recognize that this power is subject to 
outer limits.293  Although these limits undeniably shift with time, extending 
commerce authority to § 2250(a)(2)(B) signals an unprecedented expansion 
of Congress’s commerce authority.  Rather than employing a prudential or 
consequential method of constitutional interpretation, courts should look to 
the judicial decisions defining the text of the Commerce Clause.  Faithfully 
applying the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence directs the conclusion 
that Congress overreached its commerce authority. 
                                                                                                                 
 292. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) ("[W]e conclude that the 
Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with authority to enact [the statute at issue]."), 
and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) ("The statute before us upsets the 
federal balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the commerce 
power."). 
 293. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995) (articulating that the 
Commerce Clause has always been subject to constraints and outer limits). 
